claim to provide an explanation of certain systematic deviation from rational behavior using a mechanism that could arise through natural selection. We provide an arguably much simpler explanation. To argue convincingly that the type of mechanism proposed by McNamara et al. is adaptive, and is likely to be selected for by natural selection, one must argue that, in some sense, it is a better approach than the simple strategies that we propose.
Introduction
Although much animal behavior can be understood as rational, in the sense of making a best response in all situations, some systematic deviations from rationality have been observed. For example, Marsh, Schuck-Paim, and Kacelnik [2004] presented starlings with two potential food sources, one which had provided food during "tough times", when the birds had been kept at low weight, while other had provided food during "good times", when the birds were well fed. They showed that the starlings preferred the food source that had fed them during the tough times, even when that source had a longer delay to food than the other source. Similar behavior was also observed in fish and desert locusts [Aw, Holbrook, de Perera, and Kacelnik 2009; Pompilio, Kacelnik, and Behmer 2006] . McNamara, Trimmer, and Houston [2012] claim to provide an explanation of this behavior using a mechanism that could arise through natural selection. They provide an abstract model of the bird-feeding setting where a decision maker can choose either a risky action or a safe action. They also provide a mechanism that takes internal state into account and can lead to good results (where, in the example above, the internal state could include the remembered fitness of each source). However, as we observe, for the particular parameters used in their model, there is a much better (in the sense of getting a higher survival probability) and much simpler approach than their mechanism that does not take the internal state into account: simply playing safe all the time. It is hard to see how the mechanism proposed by McNamara et al. could arise in the model that they use by natural selection; the simpler mechanism would almost surely arise instead.
The fact that always playing safe does well depends on the particular parameter settings used by McNamara et al. Playing safe would not be a good idea for other parameter settings. However, we show that a a simple 2-state automaton that more or less plays according to what it last got also does quite well. It also does significantly better than the McNamara et al. mechanism, and does well in a wide variety of settings. Although our automaton also takes internal state into account (the internal state keeps track of the payoff at the last step), it does so in a minimal way, which does not suffice to explain the irrational behavior observed.
It seems to us that to argue convincingly that the type of mechanism proposed by McNamara et al. is adaptive, and is likely to be selected for by natural selection, then one must argue that, in some sense, it is a better approach than the simple strategies that we propose. Now it could be that the simple strategies we consider do not work so well in a somewhat more complicated setting, and in that setting, taking the McNamara et al.'s approach does indeed do better. However, it does not seem to be so easy to find such a setting.
We should add that we are very sympathetic to the general approach taken by McNamara et al. Indeed, our interest in the topic is due to the fact that we too have tried to explain seemingly irrational behavior, this time on the part of humans, in an appropriate model. We assume that people are resource-bounded, which we capture by modeling people as finite-state automata, following along the lines of Wilson [2014] , and argue that an optimal (or close to optimal) finite-state automaton will exhibit some of the "irrational" behavior that we observe in people [Halpern, Pass, and Seeman 2012; Halpern, Pass, and Seeman 2014] . (The 2-state automaton that we mentioned above is in fact a special case of a more general family of automata that we considered in our earlier work; we discuss the more general family in Section 3.3.)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the model used by McNamara et al. [2012] and compare it to that of [Halpern, Pass, and Seeman 2012] . In Section 3, we describe four strategies that an agent can use in the McNamara et al. model. One is the strategy used by McNamara et al.; another is a simplification of the strategy that we considered in our work; the remaining two are baseline strategies. In Section 4, we evaluate the strategies under various settings of the model parameters. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of our observations.
The model
McNamara et al. [2012] assume that agents live at most one year, and that each year is divided into two periods, winter and summer. Animals can starve to death during a winter if they do not find enough food. If an agent survives the winter, then it reproduces over the summer, and reproductive success is independent of the winter behavior.
A "winter" is a series of T discrete time steps. At any given time, the environment is in one of two states: G (good) or S (sparse); the state of the environment is hidden from the agent. At every time step there is a small probability z of the environment switching states. At each time step, there are two actions potentially available to the agent, A (which we think of as the "risky" action) or B (the "safe" action). With probability γ, both options are available to the agent; with probability (1 − γ)/2, the agent must play A; and with probability (1 − γ)/2, the agent must play B. The payoff of actions A and B depends on whether the state of the environment is G or S. An agent has a certain level of "energy reserves", denoted by an integer between 0 and 10. The maximum level of energy reserves is thus 10; an agent dies if his energy reserve level is 0. At each time step, one unit of energy reserves is consumed. At each time step, an agent receives 0, 1 or 2 units of energy. The probability of each of these amounts is drawn from a binomial distribution bin(2, p) (so that the probability of receiving 0 units is (1 − p) 2 , the probability of receiving 1 unit is 2p(1−p), and the probability of receiving 2 units is p 2 ), where p depends on the current environment state and the choice of action. P GA is used to denote the probability p when the environment is in state G and the agent played action A; we can similarly define P GB , P SA , and P SB . McNamara et al. assume that rewards are higher in expectation in the good environment for both action, that is, P GA ≥ P SA and P GB ≥ P SB ); moreover, A is the better action in the good environment, while B is better in the sparse environment, so P GA ≥ P GB and P SB ≥ P SA .
It is interesting to compare this model to that we used in our work with Pass [Halpern, Pass, and Seeman 2012] . Although, as we said in the introduction, our goal was to study irrational behavior in humans, and the kinds of behaviors we were interested in were quite different from those considered by McNamara et al. (we were interested in modeling the behavior in game playing reported by Erev, Ert, and Roth [2010] ), the models are surprisingly similar. The main differences between our model and that of McNamara et al. is that, in our model, an agent's objective is to maximize his expected average payoff over rounds (rather than just to maximize the probability of surviving for a year). In our setting, agents never die; and agent's utility is taken to be the limit of his average reward per round over an infinite time horizon. We also take γ = 1, so that an agent can always perform both the safe and risky action. Moreover, instead of observing the payoff (which is deterministically dependent on the state of the world), an agent gets a signal correlated with the real state of the environment when he plays A, and no signal when he plays B. As discussed by Halpern et al. [2012] , getting a noisy payoff as in the McNamara et al. [2012] model is essentially the same effect as getting a signal correlated with the environment's state. As we discuss later, in the scenarios we study here, P GB and P SB are very close and thus the signal we get about the environment by playing B is very weak in this model as well.
Four Strategies
In this section, we describe four strategies that an agent can use in the McNamara et al. model. We will be interested in the probability that an agent survives a "winter" period using each of these strategies. Note that the higher this probability is, the greater the probability that this strategy will emerge as the dominant strategy in an evolutionary process.
Baseline strategies
We consider two baseline strategies. The first is called the oracle strategy. With this strategy, we assume that an agent knows the true state of the environment before choosing his action, and thus can make the optimal choice in each round. While this strategy cannot be implemented by an agent in this model, we use it to provide an upper bound on the the survival probability of the agent. Clearly, no strategy can do better than the oracle strategy.
The second baseline strategy we consider is the safe strategy. With the safe strategy, the agent always plays the safe action (B) when that choice is available (recall that in some rounds the agent is forced to play A).
The value strategy
The strategy studied by McNamara et al. [2012] , which we call the value strategy, is based on keeping a value V (·) for each of the actions and choosing the action with the highest value in each round. This value is updated in every round using the formula V new = (1 − β)V old + βw, where β is a fixed parameter controlling the learning rate and w is the perceived reward, which is defined in more detail below.
In a little more detail, V (i) is initialized to the expected energy reward of action i. In a round where action i is performed, V (i) is updated using the formula above (taking V old (i) to be the currently stored value of V (i) and V new (i) to be the updated value), where w = ue k(r−5) , u is the number of energy units received as a result of performing action i, r is the current reserve level, and k is a fixed constant that might evolve to match the scenario parameters.
In a round where the agent can play both A and B (which will be the case with probability 1 − γ), it plays whichever one has higher value. That is, it plays A if V (A) ≥ V (B), and otherwise plays B.
The automaton strategy
The last strategy we consider is inspired by the strategy used by Halpern et al. [2012] ; we call it the automaton strategy. With the automaton strategy, an agent keeps an internal state that is correlated with the number of good and bad signals he has seen recently. Thus, the internal state is not determined by the agent's internal reserves, but rather by recent observations. This strategy is described by a finite automaton with n states denoted [0, . . . , n − 1]. If the automaton has a choice, then it plays action B (the "safe" action) in state 0 and plays action A in all the remaining states. (Thus, if the automaton has only one state, it plays the safe strategy.) The automaton changes state depending on the signal it observes. In our earlier work on the automaton strategy [Halpern, Pass, and Seeman 2012] , we assumed that an automaton in state 0 ≤ i < n moved to i+1 with probability p up whenever it received a signal that was highly correlated with the environment being in state G; an automaton in state i > 0 moved to state to i − 1 with probability p down whenever it receives a signal that was highly correlated with the environment being in state S; and an automaton in state 0 (which never received a signal that would cause it to move in our earlier work, since it always played B) moved to state 1 with a small "exploration" probability p exp . If an automaton did not change state according to the rules above, it just remains in the same state.
For the purposes of this paper, we take "received a signal highly correlated with environment being in state G" to mean "played A and got a reward of 2"; while "received a signal highly correlated with the environment being in state S" means "played A and got a reward of 0". (We justify these choices in the next section.) For simplicity, we take p up = p down = 1 and p exp = 0, so that the automaton is deterministic. Note that we are able to take p exp = 0 because γ > 0, so that even in state 0, the automaton will play A with probability (1 − γ)/2. (McNamara et al. [2012] also point out that randomization is useful when γ = 1.)
Evaluating the Strategies
In this section we evaluate the four strategies discussed in the previous section under various settings of the model parameters. We calculate the survival probability of an agent using the strategy over a winter of length T = 500 steps by simulating 100000 winters and looking at the ratio of runs in which the agent survived. We initialize the environment to the sparse state and the resource level to the maximum of 10.
Using the McNamara et al. parameter settings
We first study the performance of these strategies using the baseline parameter setting considered by McNamara et al. [2012] : the environment changes with probability z = 0.02 at each round; the payoffs are P GA = 0.9, P GB = 0.7, P SA = 0.4, P SB = 0.6; and γ = 0.5, so half the time, an agent has both options available, one quarter of the time, A must be played, and one quarter of the time, B must be played. Note that with these parameter settings, when playing B, the expected gain in energy reserves is very close if the environment is in state S and in state G. Thus, the agent does not learn much about the state of the environment when playing B. Thus, these parameter settings lead to a situation similar to that in [Halpern, Pass, and Seeman 2012] , where it is assumed that the agent gets no information when it plays B. On the other hand, there is a significant gap in the expected gain in energy reserves between P SA and P GA , so the agent can make useful inferences about the state of the environment based on its reward when it plays A.
According to McNamara et al, these parameter settings were chosen to ensure a high survival probability. Indeed, our baseline oracle strategy has a survival probability of roughly 91%. With McNamara et al.'s parameter settings, an animal has an expected positive gain of energy resources in each round, even though it is forced to play B one quarter of the time. In the good environment it gets an even larger expected gain in energy resources and thus gets to its maximum level with high probability. Thus, its survival probability is high, although it might still die even with this strategy.
With these parameter settings, McNamara et al. found that the value strategy performed best with the constant k used in evaluating w set to −.2, so we used this value in our experiments; we also follow McNamara et al. in taking the parameter β to be .02. With these settings, the value strategy has a survival probability of just below 80% (which matches the findings in McNamara et al. [2012] ). Note that the negative value of k says that the strategy gives greater perceived value for a reward received when its resource are low. McNamara et al. view this as a justification for animals preferring option B.
Although the value strategy does well, the safe strategy does even better. Indeed, its survival rate is almost 91%, that is, just about as good as that of the oracle strategy. This is actually straightforward to check analytically as well. 1 It is not hard to explain the good performance of the safe strategy compared to the oracle strategy. In the sparse environment it plays exactly as the oracle strategy, while in the good environment, since the expected return at each step even when playing B is high, it reaches the limit of 10 units with high probability by playing B, so playing A has no real advantage.
The automaton strategy also performs significantly better than the value strategy. An automaton with only 2 states and with deterministic transitions (so p up = p down = 1) has a survival probability of over 85%. Adding more states to the automaton did not help with this setting of the model parameters.
We tested the strategies with different lengths of winter, ranging from 100 to 1000 steps, to see how robust these outcomes are. For the value strategy we tested 3 different values of k, since McNamara et al. [2012] found that different optimal values evolve for different winter lengths. We compare the performance of all three, as well as just the maximum of them with all other strategies. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the safe strategy consistently perform as well as the oracle strategy. Also, the automaton strategy performs consistently better than the value strategy, even with only 2 states and compared to the best choice of k for each choice of T , and the gap increases as T grows.
Being safe is not always better
As we mentioned before, the safe strategy can be seen as the automaton strategy with only one state. While the safe strategy performed just about as well as the optimal oracle strategy for the parameter settings used by McNamara et al., it did not do as well for other parameter settings. Recall that that the safe strategy is just the automaton strategy with one state, which can be viewed as saying that while an automaton can get away with being "dumb" for the parameter settings considered by McNamara et al., there exist environment conditions where more states are desirable. In particular, this happens when the expected payoff of playing B drops and γ gets closer to 1, so that the agent is not forced to play A in many rounds.
For example, when P GA = 0.8, P GB = 0.55, P SA = 0.3, P SB = 0.55 (note that the expected value of both actions is the same) and γ = 0.9 we get that the survival probability of the automaton strategy with 2 states is ∼ 74% while the safe strategy only gives ∼ 70% (the oracle strategy has ∼ 86% survival probability). This gap grows as T grows. The value strategy performs quite badly with these parameter settings; it leads to a survival probability of only ∼ 5% (for the best choice of k). Having more than two states becomes more useful when playing B is bad in the good environment (i.e., P GB < 0.5) and the signal from playing A is not very strong (i.e., P SA and P GA are not too far apart). Note however, that these condition are outside the scope of parameters allowed by the model specified by McNamara et al. [2012] (as P GB < P SB if we want a good payoff for B in the sparse environment).
Discussion
Our results show that some very simple strategies seem to consistently outperform the value strategy. This gap grows as the task of surviving becomes more challenging (either because "winter" is longer or the rewards are not as high). Moreover, the automaton strategy seems more robust to different parameter settings, and does not require fine tuning of parameters. As we mentioned earlier, the automaton strategy captures human behavior in somewhat similar decision settings [Halpern, Pass, and Seeman 2012] , which is arguably further evidence that it is capturing some real phenomena in resource-bounded decision making.
We note that with both the safe strategy and the automaton strategy, action B is played much more often than action A. Thus, these strategies might also explain some of the behavior discussed by McNamara et al. [2012] , although for different reasons. Rather than animals showing a preference for the action that did well when their food reserves were low, they are showing a preference for the safe action (which also happens to be the action that did well when food reserves were low). Intuitively, animals might choose a food source with larger delay if they perceive it as being more reliable.
One advantage of the value strategy is that it does not need to "understand" that A is the "risky" action and B is the "safe" action. It just calculates a value for each strategy and plays the strategy with the higher value. By way of contrast, there is a sense in which the safe strategy and the automaton strategy need to understand beforehand that B is safe. This does not seem to us a major issue. As long as roles are reasonably stable, then evolutionary pressures would result in animals effectively learning which actions are safe and which are risky. And if roles change over time, then again we would expect mutations to survive that switched the role of A and B, provided that the change is sufficiently slow.
Although the value strategy does not need to know which action is safe and which is risky, and can thus deal with the safe and risky actions reversing roles, it does implicitly depend on the fact that parameters are changing slowly; otherwise the parameters could not be learned. Moreover, McNamara et al. take the value of β (which controls the learning rate) to be fixed. If an optimal value of β has to be learned (in addition to the value of k), this becomes quite difficult unless the environment is relatively stable. As we said, as long as we assume that what is safe and risky is relatively stable, our strategy should work well.
What happens in new environments where the animal does not initially know which actions are safe or in environments where the roles of "safe" and "risky" actions change frequently? It is easy to extend the automaton strategy by adding a "front end", so to speak, that keeps learning which action is safe and which is risky. For example, the agent can keep track of the payoffs in the last m rounds (for a small value of m, say 10-15) to see if they are in line with the current choices of safe and risky actions; if not, the choices of "safe" and "risky" can be switched. We suspect that if an animal is placed in a novel environment, so that it has not learned which action is safe nor the right value of the parameter settings in the value strategy, then it will be easier to learn which action is safe, since this is a relatively simple classification problem, than it will be to learn the appropriate settings of the parameters in the value strategy (although if it is safe to assume that β is fixed, learning just k may be easier than learning which action is safe/risky), but we have not checked this carefully.
McNamara et al. [2012] claim that " [w] hen an animal lacks knowledge of the environment it faces, it may be adaptive for the animal to base its decision upon approximate cues." We are very sympathetic to this claim, although we have argued that it may be more useful for those cues to be recent evidence about rewards, rather than internal food state, at least for the parameter settings considered by McNamara et al. It would be interesting to understand whether internal food states (or other state-dependent cues) might be more relevant for other parameter settings.
